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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION—REVIEW ON APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF 
INJUNCTION—THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHERE 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT 
THE STATUTE AT ISSUE WILL BE INVALIDATED— Brian B. v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education, 230 F.3d 582 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
Pennsylvania citizens, ages six through twenty-one, have the right to a 
free public education until graduation from high school.  Brian B. v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Deparment of Education, 230 F.3d 582, 
584 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (West 2000)).  
Pennsylvania has extended this right to juvenile delinquents and youths 
sentenced as adults to state correctional institutions by providing them with 
full education programs.  Under Pennsylvania statute, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 13-1306.2(a) (Subsection A), however, juveniles incarcerated in adult 
county correctional facilities for criminal convictions are treated like 
expelled students.  Id. at 584-85.  Consequently, these convicted juveniles 
under the age of seventeen receive minimum educational services.  Id. at 
585.  Juveniles seventeen years of age or older receive no education. 
Because of the dichotomy under Pennsylvania law, the determinative 
factor in deciding whether a youth convicted as an adult receives a full 
education is the location of his or her incarceration.  The place of 
imprisonment is determined by the length of the sentence and the 
sentencing judge’s discretion.  Youth offenders serving up to two years are 
sent to county correction centers.  Youth offenders sentenced for five years 
or more go to state facilities.  Sentencing judges have the authority to 
choose the appropriate locale for juveniles sentenced between two and five 
years. 
An exception to Subsection A created another distinction between 
convicted juveniles receiving full educational benefits and those receiving 
minimal or no education.  This exception granted full educational services 
to all school-aged pretrial detainees and all students needing special 
education due to a disability. 
A group of juveniles, who were denied education under Subsection A, 
filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania against the defendants Pennsylvania Department 
of Education (DOE), its secretary, and three local school districts.  Id. at 
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584.  Applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and using a rational basis test, the district court held that the plaintiffs did 
not demonstrate the reasonable likelihood of success required for a 
preliminary injunction.  Id. at 585.  The district court, therefore, denied the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of 
Subsection A.  Id. at 584. 
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  Id.  The plaintiffs argued 
that the district court erred by failing to apply intermediate scrutiny review 
under Plyler v. Doe, because Subsection A detrimentally affects education.  
Id. at 585 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).  The plaintiffs 
alternatively asserted that even if this more stringent standard is rejected by 
the court, Subsection A should be barred from enforcement because it is 
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.  Id. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion 
for a preliminary injunction, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that the Pennsylvania statute, which restricts the 
education of juveniles sentenced as adults to county correctional facilities, 
will be invalidated.  Id. at 588.  Circuit Judge Stapleton, writing for the 
majority of the court, began his analysis by listing the factors a court must 
consider when deciding whether or not to grant a motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  Id. at 585.  The moving party must show, according to the 
judge: (1) a demonstrated probability of success on the merits; (2) 
demonstrated irreparable harm to the movant; (3) significant harm to the 
nomoving party; and (4) the effect on the public’s interest.  Id.  Judge 
Stapleton then explained the circuit court’s method of review.  Id.  First, 
the majority stated that the appellate court reviews the district court’s legal 
conclusions de novo.  Id.  Second, the majority explained that the appellate 
court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error.  Id.  Third, 
the majority clarified that the appellate court verifies that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in granting or denying the preliminary 
injunction.  Id. 
Next, the court clarified the court’s reasoning for rejecting the 
heightened scrutiny standard applied in Plyler v. Doe, a Supreme Court 
case challenging a statute that prevented the allocation of state money to 
educate children of illegal aliens.  Id. at 586 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982)).  Judge Stapleton articulated that the Supreme Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny in Plyler because of the “unique circumstances” in 
which innocent children were being denied education due to the unlawful 
actions of their parents.  Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).  
The court distinguished Plyler from the present case by emphasizing that 
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the juveniles here are being deprived of equal educational services due to 
their own illegal actions.  Id.  The court, therefore, rejected the application 
of heightened scrutiny and continued to analyze the case under a rational 
basis review.  Id. 
The majority indicated that a statute that does not infringe upon a 
fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class will be deemed 
constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  Id.  The 
court, moreover, suggested that the plaintiffs must show that the 
classification is wholly irrational to rebut the statute’s presumption of 
validity.  Id.  The court noted that the plaintiffs can demonstrate this 
irrationality by disproving every justification for the classification.  Id. 
Next, Judge Stapleton legitimized the defendant’s justifications for 
Subsection A’s distinction between juvenile offenders incarcerated in 
county facilities and juvenile offenders imprisoned in state institutions.  Id. 
at 586-88.  The court conceded that the statute’s effect of limiting 
education services provided to juveniles in adult county correctional 
facilities was rationally related to the legitimate concern about insufficient 
space in a few local adult correctional facilities.  Id. at 587  The majority 
then asserted that it was improper to second-guess the legislature’s decision 
to reduce high per student costs in county facilities by limiting the 
education of convicted juveniles incarcerated in local adult correctional 
facilities.  Id. at 587-88. 
Judge Stapleton justified the excluded classes under Subsection A by 
reasoning that (1) pretrial detainees have not yet been pronounced guilty, 
(2) special education students have a greater need for education than the 
average student, and (3) educating all youths in juvenile facilities is less 
costly because all the inmates are students.  Id. at 587.  The legislature’s 
decision to provide full education benefits to juvenile inmates in state 
facilities, the court noted, was rationally related to its intent to avoid 
security problems agitated by the suspension of existing education 
programs in state correctional facilities.  Id. at 588.  The court also 
validated the defendants’ position that state inmates, who are generally 
imprisoned for longer sentences, would benefit more from scholastic 
programs than county inmates, who are incarcerated for less than five 
years.  Id. at 587-88. 
After holding that Subsection A is rationally related to the 
legislature’s legitimate state interest, the court distinguished the present 
case from Romer v. Evans.  Id. at 588 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996)).  The majority noted that in Romer, the Supreme Court found no 
rational basis exists where a specific class of individuals, homosexuals, is 
denied a right based on a single trait.  Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, 
635).  The court concluded that, unlike in Romer, a rational basis exists in 
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the present case because the class of youths is not identifiable by one trait.  
Id.  Moreover, the court noted that the youths’ burden is limited to an 
educational context.  Id.  Based upon this conclusion, the circuit court 
affirmed the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction.  Id. 
In her dissent, Judge Roth agreed with the majority that the case 
should be analyzed under a rational basis test, but criticized the court for 
giving too much deference to the Pennsylvania legislature.  Id. at 588-89 
(Roth, J., dissenting).  Judge Roth asserted that Subsection A’s 
discrimination against juvenile county inmates does not meet a rational 
basis test for several reasons.  Id. at 589 (Roth, J., dissenting).  Judge Roth 
stated that education should not be denied arbitrarily to one group because 
of the potential detrimental impact it would have on both the “basic 
institutions” of our country and “the life of the child.”  Id. at 589-90 (Roth, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).  The 
dissent also advised that the court should scrutinize the equal protection 
rights of prisoners because the legislature might not.  Id. at 590 (Roth, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent concluded that the defendants’ justifications for 
denying this particular group access to education were inconsistent, and 
therefore, not rationally related to the government’s asserted interests.  Id. 
The dissent, thereafter, demonstrated the arbitrariness of the five 
classifications created by Subsection A.  Id. at 590-93 (Roth, J., dissenting).  
First, the dissent stated that the plaintiffs have rebutted the defendants’ 
claim that youths incarcerated in adult, county facilities must be denied 
educational services due to inadequate space.  Id. at 590-91 (Roth, J., 
dissenting).  According to Judge Roth, this justification of inadequate space 
is arbitrary because the facilities make space for the education of pre-trial 
detainees and special education students.  Id. at 591 (Roth, J., dissenting).  
In addition, the dissent noted that the concern about inadequate space is 
tenuous because the number of juvenile inmates in the local facility 
changes every day and the dilemma of inadequate space can be remedied 
through proper prioritizing by the DOE.  Id. 
The dissent also rejected the defendant’s second justification 
concerning high per-pupil costs in adult county facilities.  Id. (Roth, J., 
dissenting).  The DOE, the dissent claimed, would have prohibited 
education in all county facilities if it were truly worried about curtailing 
expenditures on the education of prisoners.  Id.  Judge Roth proposed that 
utilizing technological advances, like “closed-circuit television,” in 
correctional facilities could provide educational opportunities to several 
groups at a lower cost.  Id.  In addition, the dissent opined that the 
Pennsylvania DOE’s decision to provide educational services to some 
county inmates and not to others is arbitrary in itself, and therefore, does 
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not even justify a legitimate goal to minimize state expenses.  Id. at 592 
(Roth, J., dissenting).   
The dissent further questioned the defendants’ argument that pre-trial 
detainees are properly excluded, because they have not yet been found 
guilty.  Id. at 591 (Roth, J., dissenting).  The defendants’ assertion, Judge 
Roth insisted, is not rationally related to the purpose of the statute and 
infers that convicted juveniles in state facilities should be prohibited from 
receiving education.  Id.  Next, the dissent argued that even though the 
defendants claim that special education students are entitled to free public 
education under federal law, the statute is still unjustifiable.  Id.  Judge 
Roth continued her analysis by rejecting the defendants’ third 
justification—that state inmates would benefit more from educational 
services than would county inmates.  Id. at 592 (Roth, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent recognized that the defendants’ argument that state inmates are “too 
transient” is undermined by the fact that pretrial detainees, who are an even 
“more transient class,” are granted the right to full educational benefits.  Id.  
The dissent also noted that some state inmates are incarcerated for a shorter 
time than some county inmates because those youths sentenced between 
two and five years may be imprisoned in either facility based on the judge’s 
discretion.  Id.  The judge, therefore, declared that the defendants’ 
reasoning that state inmates are less likely to go back to school is flawed.  
Id. 
Judge Roth, continuing her dissent, characterized the defendants’ 
intention to prevent security problems in state prisons as irrelevant, because 
the plaintiffs were not arguing that education should be denied to youths in 
state facilities.  Id.  The dissent also attacked the attenuated relationship 
between expelled students and convicted youths.  Id. at 592-93 (Roth, J., 
dissenting).  Convicted juveniles should not be treated like expelled 
students, purported the dissent, because there is no rational connection 
between the two groups.  Id. at 593 (Roth, J., dissenting).  Judge Roth 
distinguished the two groups by pointing out that a student, who is expelled 
from school for violating school rules, is denied only a free public 
education.  Id.  The dissent proffered that an expelled student can continue 
his or her education in a private school but a juvenile delinquent cannot 
choose an alternative education program.  Id.  Judge Roth concluded that 
because she believes the plaintiffs have demonstrated a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits, the case should be remanded to the 
trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs proved the necessary 
elements for a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 594 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
Brian B. exemplifies a situation in which the court struggles between 
its duty to enforce constitutional principles, such as the Equal Protection 
Clause, and its duty to refrain from judicial intervention into legislative 
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determinations.  It also demonstrates the difficulty in determining whether 
legislative action is rationally related to a legitimate interest, or whether the 
government’s justification is mere pretext disguised as a lawful purpose. 
The majority’s opinion reflects a strong desire to justify the 
legislature’s actions.  This justification is demonstrated by the majority’s 
continuous effort to avoid second-guessing the legislature and by its brief, 
indulgent review of the defendants’ reasoning.  Although some deference 
to the legislature is necessary, the majority created reasons to support the 
defendants.  Judge Roth’s detailed dissent, however, realistically 
demonstrated that the defendants’ intentions do not relate to the denial of 
education to a narrowly defined group of individuals.  As Judge Roth 
stated, the majority failed to recognize the inconsistencies in the 
defendants’ justifications.  See id. at 590, 593 (Roth, J., dissenting).  
Although rational basis review is a lenient standard, it deserves careful 
consideration, especially where such important issues like education and 
equal protection are concerned.  While the court has decided to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s challenges, the legislature may want to more carefully consider 
the dissent’s thorough analysis. 
Rebecca A. Oleksy 
 
